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Abstract
The LHC injection systems consist of horizontally
deflecting steel septum magnets and vertically deflecting
kickers. A mobile beam stopper is placed downstream of
the kickers for setting up with single bunches and to
protect the superconducting machine elements during
normal injection in the event of a malfunctioning of the
kickers. The effects of various potential kicker failures
and their impact on the machine have been investigated.
The injection parameters, the design principles of the
stopper and additional protection measures are discussed.
1  INTRODUCTION
Two new beam transfer lines with a combined length of
5.6 km and using over 700 room-temperature magnets, TI
2 and TI 8, are being built at CERN to transport
450 GeV/c protons from SPS to LHC [1]. An overview of
these lines is given in [2].
TI 2 leads to the injection into LHC ring 1 near
intersection 2 (IP2), TI 8 to the injection into ring 2 near
intersection 8 (IP8). Civil engineering for both lines has
started in 1998. First injection tests are foreseen for
autumn 2003 (TI 8) and mid 2005 (TI 2).
A schematic plan view of an injection region is given in
Figure 1: Schematic plan view of IP2 injection
Fig. 1. The beam to be injected passes through 5
horizontally deflecting steel septum magnets (MSI) with a
total deflection of 12 mrad and a vertically deflecting
kicker (MKI), consisting of 4 modules, with a nominal
total kick strength of 0.85 mrad [3]. A mobile beam
stopper (TDI), consisting of 2 absorber blocks positioned
a few mm above and below the nominal LHC orbit, will
be placed some 70 m downstream of the MKI, at a phase
distance of ∆µy = 90°. Its main role is to protect the
immediately following (cold) separation dipole D1
against  miskicked bunches and to receive intentionally




beam during commissioning and verification/re-
adjustment of the injection before each fill.
The main beam and kicker parameters are given in
Table 1. The destructive power of the beam imposes high
precision and very good protection when injecting beam
into the small aperture, superconducting LHC. The
quench limit (through  instantaneous energy deposition in
a coil) is assumed to 38 mJ/cm3 [4], the damage limit to
87 J/cm3 [5].
Table 1: Beam and kicker parameters at injection
 Beam (proton) momentum  450 GeV/c
 Nominal single bunch intensity  1.1*1011 p
 Nom. batch intensity (3*81 bunches)  2.67*1013 p
 Ultim. batch intensity (3*81 bunches)  4.13*1013 p
 Bunch distance  25 ns
 Nom. norm’d transverse emittance
 3.5 µm rad
 Nominal kick strength  0.85 mrad
 Kicker rise time
 0.9 µs
 Kicker flat top length
 6.6 µs
 Kicker fall time
 3 µs
In the following the various modes of using the
MKI/TDI ensemble, either intentionally or accidentally,
will be described. Then, results of simulations are
presented leading to a preliminary design of an
appropriate TDI. Finally, the impact of particles escaping
the TDI on the LHC is looked at, discussing the benefit
from supplementary protection elements.
2  OPERATIONAL AND FAILURE
MODES
Various circumstances of using the MKI/TDI ensemble
have been investigated and listed in Table 2, grouped into
“cases” with the same total kick strength seen by the
beam, in order of decreasing expected occurrence.
Operational (intentional) uses (marked shaded) imply
normally the use of single bunches, accidental or
emergency uses have to proceed from the assumption of
full batch intensity.
Case 2 (sweep) occurs when the passage of beam to be
injected or circulating beam coincides with the rise or fall
slope of the kicker pulse. The latter case results in close
to 100 bunches put on various places of the TDI and close
to 20 bunches escaping the TDI (assuming linear kick
slope). One of the reasons for a beam sweep is a possible
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prefire of one of the kicker modules. Special precautions
are foreseen to make this very unlikely, or to reduce its
consequences, e.g. applying the high voltage only very
shortly before the trigger pulse to the thyratron switches
or  firing rapidly the other three kicker modules if one
produces a prefire.
Table 2: Operational (shaded) and failure modes of the
MKI/TDI ensemble
Case Kick [%] Reason(s) [expected rate]
1 0 Setting-up [during commissioning]
Verification/re-adjustment [before each
fill]
SPS extraction launched but LHC not
ready [occasional]
Trigger missing (MKI internal or
external) [rare]
2 0-100 Beam sweep:
Wrong timing (MKI internal or
external) [occasional]
Prefire of one MKI module, followed
by firing the other 3 [rare]
3 75 One MKI module full fault [rare]
4 75-125 One MKI module flashover or equiv.
[extremely rare] (grazing case ≈ 86 %)
Fig. 2 shows a simplified side view (left) of the
injection region (not to scale), with an enlarged front
view (right) of the upper TDI block, showing
schematically the beam impacts for the different cases.
Figure 2: Schematic side view (left) of injection area
(case 1 shown); enlarged beam view (right) of upper TDI
block with schematic beam impacts for various cases
(case 4 shown for grazing impact).
Case 1 corresponds to an impact distance from the
bottom edge of about 30 mm, case 3 to about 3.5 mm.
The lower TDI block (not shown) is foreseen to receive
miskicked circulating beam in mirrored positions. At
injection the TDI blocks are supposed to be ± 8.5 σ
(tangential to the machine aperture) or less distant from
the LHC orbit (corresponding to about ± 4.3 mm).
 3  TDI/D1 SIMULATION RESULTS
 The TDI/D1 ensemble has been simulated using FLUKA
[6]. For the most frequent case 1 the length and the
composition of the TDI was varied. The results are shown
in Fig. 3, plotted as maximum energy deposition in the
D1 coil against the number of interaction lengths of the
TDI. The transverse dimensions were kept fixed at 8*8
cm. Even though the counter-rotating beam imposes a
space limitation in the horizontal plane, these dimensions
reveal to be sufficient with a contribution from lateral
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 Figure 3: Energy deposition in D1 coil as a function of
the number of interaction lengths of the TDI (case 1).
 
 Sandwich constructs of appropriate materials have the
benefit over full graphite to stay below the quench limit
even for full batches, at a comparable length. A sequence
of 2.5 m graphite, 1 m aluminium, 0.5 m copper and 0.3
m tungsten (marked with arrow) has been chosen as
“reference TDI”. In a next step it has been investigated
what protection this TDI procures to D1 in the various
cases. The results are given in table 3.
 
Table 3: Energy deposition in D1 coil (preliminary) for
various cases (reference TDI)
 
Case Error Energy deposition in D1 coil [J/cm3]
[%] 1.1*1011 p 2.67*1013 p 4.13*1013 p
1 50 1.8*10-5 4.3*10-3 6.7*10-3
2 50 6.8 10.5
3 50 2.3*10-2 5.6 8.7
4 25 0.25 60.3 93.3
 
 Case 1 leads to no quench, even with highest intensi-
ties. Full batches in cases 2 and 3 will, without additional
measures, quench D1. Case 4 (values given for grazing
impact) approaches the damage limit for a nominal full
batch and surpasses it slightly for the ultimate intensity.
To test the effect from additional shielding a copper
cylinder (25 ≤ r ≤ 140 mm, 1m long) has been introduced
in the simulation 3 m in front of D1. This reduced the
energy deposition by about a factor 120, thus excluding
damage to D1 under all circumstances. Whereas such a
shield would only be mandatory for case 4 with highest
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figure for the sweep case at nominal batch intensity is
then close to the quench level. Some further shield
optimisation will probably allow to fall short of the
quench level for this case.
A perspective sketch of the preliminary design of the
reference TDI is given in Fig. 4. Each TDI block has 2
servo motors allowing a vertical adjustment with a
precision of better than 0.1 mm. The enlargement in
Fig. 4 (upper left corner) shows the front face of the TDI
in more detail. The main absorber material is shrink-
mounted into an aluminium frame, attached to an iron
beam which in turn is moved by the motors. The required
vertical movement is relatively small in IP8 but in IP2 it
must take into account the opening requirements of the
ALICE Zero Degree Calorimeter [7].
Figure 4: Perspective sketch of the TDI assembly
(preliminary).
4 OTHER IMPACTS THAN ON D1
4.1 Triplets / Dispersion Suppressors / Arcs
 The effect of injected bunches missing the TDI on other
parts of the LHC than D1 has also been looked at. Two
worst cases are considered:
 Firstly, the case 2 where close to 20 bunches could be
swept between the orbit and the TDI edge, starting to
oscillate around the orbit. The mean particle density is
about 2*1010 p / 0.1 σ. The damage level is estimated to
be 1012 p lost per m, the quench level 109 p lost per m.
Damage seems therefore excluded, but to avoid a quench
the TDI must be set such that it covers entirely the
machine aperture of 8.5 σ.
 Secondly, the case 4 with a full batch just missing the
TDI edge. Here the worst case particle density is about
1.6*1012 p / 0.1 σ (peak). Excluding machine damage
with certainty would again require a sufficient closure of
the TDI.
 Two additional collimators, positioned at a phase
advance ∆µ ≈ ± 20° from the TDI (at around Q6/Q7 on
the other side of the injection insertions), with the same
aperture, would provide the same protection as the TDI in
the presence of phase errors.
4.2 Cleaning Sections
 Badly injected particles oscillating around the LHC orbit
between  8.5 σ (TDI) and 7 σ (primary cleaning collima-
tors) will end up in the LHC cleaning sections. This does
not cause problems for a few bunches, but if a full batch
is lost in this area, the collimators are likely to be
damaged.
4.3 Experiments
Since the aperture of the experimental vacuum chambers
is large compared to the machine aperture, it seems
excluded that parts of the detectors can be hit directly by
misinjected bunches. However particles leaking out of the
TDI or supplementary protection elements or scattered
particles may reach the experiments in IP2 and IP8. Their
impact is however at present estimated to be insignificant
compared to the radiation from normal operation. More
detailed studies are required to confirm this assumption.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The destructive beam power and the LHC characteristics
as superconducting, small-aperture machine require
highest care at injection. Mishaps can have severe
consequences. Although the injection kickers are being
built for utmost reliability, failures are not entirely
excluded. Simulations of these failures reveal that a beam
stopper with supplementary shielding and collimators
can, appropriate setting assumed, provide sufficient
protection, except in very rare cases where the warm
aperture limiting cleaning collimators can be affected.
6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The fruitful discussions with members of the CERN SL-
BT kicker team are gratefully acknowledged. M. Goujon
is thanked for the sketch of the TDI.
7 REFERENCES
[1] The LHC Study Group, “The Large Hadron Collider Conceptual
Design”, CERN/AC/95-05 (LHC) (1995).
[2] A. Hilaire, V. Mertens, E. Weisse, “Beam Transfer to and Injection
into LHC”, Proc. EPAC’98, Stockholm (1998) and CERN/LHC
Project Report 208 (1998).
[3] L. Ducimetière et al., “Design of the Injection Kicker Magnet
System for CERN's 14 TeV Proton Collider LHC”, Proc. IEEE
Pulsed Power Conference, Albuquerque, USA, July 10-13, 1995.
[4] J. B. Jeanneret et al., CERN/LHC Project Report 44 (1996).
[5] O. Brüning, J. B. Jeanneret, CERN/LHC Project Note 141 (1998).
[6] A. Fassò, A. Ferrari, J. Ranft, P. Sala, “FLUKA: Present Status and
Future Developments”, Proc. Int. Conf. on Calorimetry in High
Energy Physics, La Biodola (Is. d’Elba), Italy, September 20-25,
1993, Eds. A.Menzione and A.Scribano, World Scientific, p.493.
[7] ALICE Technical Design Report of the Zero Degree Calorimeter
(ZDC), CERN/LHCC 99-5 (1999).
42
Proceedings of the 1999 Particle Accelerator Conference, New York, 1999
